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Why Do Institutional Investors Oppose Shareholder Activism? Evidence from
Voting in Proxy Contests
Yanran Liu, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This paper documents significant heterogeneity in institutional investors’ support for share-
holder activism in proxy contests and examines the following question: why do institutional
shareholders frequently vote against activists when the activists’ actions increase the value
of target firms? I propose that the voting decisions of institutional investors depend on the
effect of shareholder activism on the return of the institutions’ combined shareholdings in
both targets and their rival firms. Because institutions underweight target firms and activism
could adversely affect the values of rival firms, institutional investors often lack incentives to
support activists when gains on targets are diluted or offset by losses on rival firms. Using
hand-collected data of mutual and pension fund voting in proxy contests, I find evidence that
institutions that benefit less from activism events are less likely to support the activists, even
when the activist’s effect on the target firm’s stock price is positive. Furthermore, when tar-
get firms do not have publicly-traded competitors, institutional investors are more likely to
support activists. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors’
portfolio returns explain whether or not they support activists.
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1.0 Introduction
Shareholder activism, especially hedge fund activism, on average increases the value of
firms that are targeted by activists (Brav et al. 2008a, Bebchuk et al. 2015 and Brav et al.
2015b).1 Despite this positive effect on the value of target firms, I find that institutional
investors often vote against activists in proxy contests. This observation prompts the follow-
ing question: why do institutional investors often oppose value-increasing actions in firms in
which they own equity? This paper attempts to address this question.
I propose that the voting decisions of institutional investors depend on the effect of
shareholder activism on the return of the institutions’ combined shareholdings in both the
target firms and their rival firms. Given that institutions often underweight target firms and
shareholder activism on average adversely affects the stock prices and operating performance
of rival firms (Aslan and Kumar, 2016), gains that institutions receive on their holdings of
target firms often offset, in whole or in part, by losses incurred on their holdings of rival
firms. Because institutional investors compete based on relative performance (Sirri and
Tufano, 1998; Bebchuk et al., 2017; Bebchuk and Hirst, 2018a), they don’t have strong
incentives to support activists when losses on rival firms offset gains on targets. I predict
that institutions that benefit less from activism events are less likely to support the activists.
Trian Fund Management’s proxy contest with DuPont provides anecdotal evidence con-
sistent with this hypothesis. On July 17th, 2013, the media disclosed Trian’s equity stake
in DuPont. DuPont’s cumulative abnormal return was a statistically significant (at the 1%
level) 4.86% over a seven-day window.2 Trian subsequently launched a proxy contest for four
board seats in 2015 and proposed to increase DuPont’s value by breaking the company into
four parts. Three large institutional investors, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street, who
collectively owned 15.4% of Dupont, revealed in SEC filings that they had voted against
Trian’s nominees for DuPont in the election. On the day when the election results were
released and Trian failed to get any board seats, DuPont’s abnormal return was -6.73%.
1For a comprehensive review, see (Brav et al., 2015a; Denes et al., 2017).
2I use a seven-day window here because Trian’s position in DuPont was first disclosed by media and Trian
announced its plan four business days later.
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During the proxy battle, Trian claimed that DuPont was underperforming relative to its
peers, including, most notably, Monsanto, a key rival of DuPont’s agricultural seed business.3
In a presentation to DuPont shareholders, Trian referred to Monsanto 30 times, focusing on
how DuPont had failed to deploy its balance sheet to boost shareholder returns, and lost
a patent lawsuit involving seed technology to Monsanto. Trian first revealed its proposals
for DuPont on July 24th, 2013.4 Over a seven-day window surrounding this announcement,
Monsanto’s cumulative abnormal return was -4.81% and significant at the 1% level, sug-
gesting that the market viewed Trian’s plans for DuPont as being detrimental to Monsanto.
Upon the release of the news that Trian was defeated, Monsanto’s abnormal return was
1.88% and significant at the 10% level.
Table 1 illustrates the shareholdings of large institutional investors in both DuPont and
Monsanto as of March 31st, 2015, the end of the quarter immediately before the annual
meeting date of DuPont, and their voting decisions in the proxy contest. Panel A shows that
nine of the ten largest institutional investors in DuPont were mutual and pension funds that
held shares in Monsanto. Only five of the funds supported Trian in the proxy fight. In Figure
1, I discuss how I measure each institution’s economic incentive before voting. Specifically, I
use the market reactions to DuPont and Monsanto when Trian disclosed its plan to measure
the potential benefits or costs if Trian won and implemented its plans to increase DuPont’s
value. In Panel B, I then calculate each institution’s value-weighted portfolio return using
holdings before the annual meeting and the initial announcement returns.5 The higher the
return, the more the institution benefits from Trian’s victory. In Table 1, I show that
institutions that potentially benefit more from supporting Trian are more likely to vote for
Trian’s nominees. On the other hand, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street would not
benefit from Trian’s actions based on combined returns in DuPont and Monsanto, so all
three voted against the Trian’s nominees.
Because the returns to activists and institutions who own shares in both the target firms
3Schmalz (2015): How passive funds prevent competition. Reuters: DuPont seeks exit from paints busi-
ness to focus on farms (https://www.reuters.com/article/dupont-results/update-5-dupont-seeks-exit-from-
paints-business-to-focus-on-farms-idUSL4N0FT26620130723)
4DuPont: SCHEDULE 14A (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30554/000104746915002338/a22
23550zprer14a.htm)
5In robust tests, I also use the holdings immediately before the 13D announcement dates, and the results
are similar. I discuss the time-series changes in holdings in the robustness section.
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and their rivals can be quite different, the institutions often lack an economic incentive to
support activists. The evidence that I find on the voting decisions of institutional investors in
113 proxy contests from July 2013 to June 2017 is consistent with this prediction. Specifically,
I exploit the variation in institutional ownership in targets and their rival firms to assess the
relation between the returns on the institutions’ combined holdings of targets and their rivals
and their voting decisions in proxy contests.
I first document that there exists a significant variation in support for activists among
institutional investors in proxy contests. Institutional investors on average voted against
activists in one-fifth to one-fourth of the cases even when the most influential proxy advi-
sor, ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services), endorsed the activists.6 Fund families whose
portfolios mainly consist of index funds and ETFs, such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street, are more likely to vote against the activists than other institutional investors. Within
same proxy contests, passive funds are 30 percentage points less likely to support the ac-
tivists when ISS endorsed the dissident nominees. I then calculate institutional investors’
industry portfolio returns and find that institutional investors of target firms with returns
in the top decile are 12.93% percent (more than 50% of the 25% average rejection rate when
ISS support the activists) less likely to vote against the activists than institutional investors
with returns in the bottom decile in proxy contests.
Using multivariate regression models, I find that institutions that benefit less from ac-
tivism events are more likely to vote against the activists. To alleviate the concern that
announcement returns incorporate potential merits and probabilities of success, I control for
meeting fixed effects and institution fixed effects. In this specification, I am comparing insti-
tutions that voted in the same meetings but have different industry portfolio returns while
controlling for the institutions’ average propensity to support the activists. The results
6Although there is a concern that ISS issues blanket recommendations for regular proposals, ISS does
put in a significant amount of effort to evaluate cases of proxy contests and issues very detailed analysis for
each case in addition to examining announcement returns around important events. See Alexander et al.
(2010) for a discussion of the important role of ISS in influencing proxy voting and the evidence that voting
advice is both predictive about contest outcomes and informative about the ability of dissidents to add value.
McCahery et al. (2016) survey institutional investors and find that most investors use proxy advisors and
believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions. In Table 11
and Table A3, I show that there are significant differences in market reactions of the meeting results when
the activists won or lost. The CARs when the activists won are significantly higher than CARs when the
activists lost around meeting dates.
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are robust with respect to an alternative industry definition and an alternative measure
of holdings before the announcement dates. Furthermore, when target firms do not have
publicly-traded rivals, institutional investors are more likely to support the activists. These
results are broadly consistent with my prediction that institutional investors’ support for the
activists depends on their portfolio holdings in both the targets and their competitors.
I contribute to the literature of how the ownership structures of firms affect the outcomes
of activism campaigns. Institutional ownership has increased significantly over the last four
decades. Although the sizes of institutions grow larger, institutions, especially passive in-
vestors, also hold a much higher number of stocks. Ownership concentration (HHI) has
gone down, and firms in the same industry are more likely to be held by the same block-
holders (see Figure 2). Appel et al. (2018) show that activists are more likely to pursue
changes in corporate control or influence when larger shares of the target company stocks
are held by passively managed mutual funds, assuming that (passive) institutional investors
are homogeneous. Kedia et al. (2016) relax this assumption and show that activism-friendly
institutional investors are associated with better performance of activism target firms, but
they do not explain why some institutional investors are more friendly to activists. This
paper contributes to the literature by first showing that there is significant variation in
support for activists in events that are viewed as value-increasing to target firms by the
market and leading proxy advisors and then proposing an economic explanation for it. The
results in this paper indicate that Appel et al. (2018) who study the relation between total
(passive) institutional ownership and shareholder activism are likely to misinterpret their
results. Appel et al. (2018) show that an exogenous increase in the target firm’s passive
ownership increases passive institutions’ incentive to support the activist. However, it does
not imply that passive institutional investors unconditionally support shareholder activism.
As I argue in this paper, it is the relative increases in portfolio weights of target firms that
increase the incentive of passive institutions to support activists. Second, to the best of my
knowledge, this is also the first paper to propose an economic explanation for the support
of shareholder activism by institutional investors and to provide evidence that institutional
investors’ combined portfolio holdings, not only their target firm holdings, explain whether
or not they support activists.
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This paper also contributes to the debate on the anti-competitive effects of common
ownership (Azar et al., 2018; Dennis et al., 2017). However, the results in this paper are
not necessarily consistent with the collusion hypothesis, which posits that commonly-held
public firms are more likely to maximize portfolio values through product-market collusion.
Instead, the evidence in this paper is more consistent with Bebchuk et al. (2017), Bebchuk
and Hirst (2018a) and Bebchuk and Hirst (2018b) who show the incentives of diversified or
passive investors make them ”under-invest in stewardship and to be deferential toward the
corporate managers of portfolio companies. . . policymakers should be primarily concerned
that investment fund managers engage too little and not that they engage too much.” This
paper provides empirical evidence to support their arguments that index funds have espe-
cially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities. While activist hedge funds have
substantially better incentives than managers of passive investors, they often do not get
support from passive investors because of the negative externality of activism events.
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2.0 Literature review
2.1 Shareholder activism’s effects on target firms’ value
The literature has extensively studied the rise in shareholder activism. Shareholder ac-
tivism in the forms of shareholder proposals and negotiations have insignificant valuation
effects, while hedge fund activism, proxy fights, and takeovers have significant (5% to 15%
on average) positive effects on target company valuations (Denes et al., 2017). Denes et al.
(2017) conclude that the past thirty years of shareholder activism have seen numerous inno-
vations that improve monitoring and lower agency costs. These results are consistent with
the argument of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that managerial agency problems are controlled
in part by dynamic changes in ownership, and with the observation of Alchian (1950) that
business practices adapt over time to mimic successful strategies. This paper focuses on the
activism campaigns in recent years and tries to shed light on the interaction between activist
shareholders and other important institutional investors, such as mutual and pension funds.
Earlier studies find no significant benefits for shareholders when large and diversified
institutional investors, particularly mutual and pension funds, launch activism campaigns
(Black, 1998; Karpoff, 2001; Romano, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2007). As argued by Brav
et al. (2008a), activism campaigns by mutual and pension funds are ineffective compared to
hedge funds because of the differences in their organizational form and incentives. Unlike
mutual and pension funds, Hedge funds employ highly incentivized managers who manage
large unregulated pools of capital. They are not subject to regulations that govern mutual
funds, and they can hold highly concentrated positions in a small number of companies.
Empirical evidence in recent years finds that hedge fund activism, on average, signifi-
cantly increases the value of firms that are targeted by activists (Brav et al., 2008a; Bebchuk
et al., 2015; Brav et al., 2015a). Brav et al. (2015b) find that plants sold after intervention
improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that asset redeployment
is an important channel for value creation. Brav et al. (2008a) also show that hedge fund ac-
tivism increases innovation output and improves long-term innovation efficiency even though
6
target firms significantly reduce R&D expenses.
Although the academic literature shows that hedge fund activism generally increases
the value of target firms, many practitioners claim that the alleged short-termism of hedge
funds make companies focus on short-term results and eventually hurt shareholders in the
long term. Cremers et al. (2018) show that target firms perform worse than control firms
matched based on pre-activism firm characteristics. However, they do not present evidence
that hedge funds exit when short-term prices increase and target firms subsequently perform
worse, which is a key prediction of the short-termism argument. Contrary to predictions
of short-termism, Brav et al. (2008a) find no negative market reactions when hedge funds
exit their positions in target firms. Furthermore, Boyson and Pichler (2018) find that target
firms with the most hostile resistance to activists generate the highest value to shareholders.
This finding is consistent with the view that agency costs are more severe among these firms.
If the short-termism argument is valid, we would expect these campaigns to generate zero
or negative returns in the long-run.
2.2 Externalities of Activist Campaigns
The premise of this paper relies on previous evidence that hedge fund activism imposes
significant externalities on other firms. Aslan and Kumar (2016) examine the product mar-
ket spillover effects of hedge fund activism. They document that hedge fund activism has
negative and real stockholder wealth effects on the average rival firm. However, there is
substantial heterogeneity in these spillover effects, based on rivals’ post-activism improve-
ments, financial constraints, and the threat of them being targeted by shareholder activism.
Specifically, financially constrained rivals are less likely to show improvements and more
likely to suffer more adverse product market consequences. On the other hand, rivals that
are likely future targets of activism (and presumably had initiated proactive reforms) can
compete on the basis of strategic complements — that is, to improve their product market
performance — after activism, consistent with findings by Zhu (2014) and Gantchev et al.
(2018). More importantly, Aslan and Kumar (2016) show that financial markets anticipate
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the spillover effects. In particular, the heterogeneity in the spillover effects is reflected in the
announcement returns of intervention events on rivals’ stock returns.
Other stakeholders also can be negatively affected by shareholder activism. An ear-
lier version of Aslan and Kumar (2016) finds that hedge fund activism targets gain higher
bargaining power with their customers and suppliers after the intervention. Klein and Zur
(2011) find evidence that the average excess bond return is -3.9% around the initial 13D
filing dates because activists often ask firms to repurchase more shares, increase dividends,
and increase leverage. Estimating the negative impact on bondholders is much more chal-
lenging because there are many different types of bonds outstanding for each firm and bond
market liquidity is low (Klein and Zur (2011) only use the most recently issued bond as
the representative bond for the firm). Because institutional investors also hold a substantial
amount of corporate bonds, they also are hurt by the negative externalities on debt holders.
In this paper, I focus on institutions’ stock holdings in rival firms because they have the
most significant economic impact on their returns.
2.3 Role of Institutional Investors in Shareholder Activism
Median institutional ownership of publicly traded U.S. firms has grown from 5% in 1980
to 70% in 2018 of the U.S. In the meantime, there has been tremendous change in the own-
ership of publicly-traded firms in the U.S. Consolidation in the asset management industry,
and the rise in mutual fund investing has led a small number of institutional investors to
become the largest shareholders in most publicly listed firms. As a result, competing firms
are increasingly becoming owned, in part, by the same large institutions. The fraction of
U.S. public firms that are commonly owned – i.e., have at least one investor that simulta-
neously owns a large investment stake in the firm and at least one of its competitors – has
increased from around 10 percent in 1980 to approximately 75 percent in 2017 (see Figure 2).
BlackRock and Vanguard are among the largest five shareholders of more than 53 percent of
U.S.-listed firms in the Compustat universe (Park et al., 2019). These institutional investors
can have a significant influence on the types of campaigns undertaken by activists, the tactics
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they employ, and eventual outcomes of proxy contests. Appel et al. (2018) study the relation
between passive ownership and activism event outcomes. They find activists are more likely
to seek board representation when a larger share of the target company’s stock is held by
passively managed mutual funds. Furthermore, higher passive ownership is associated with
the increased use of proxy fights, settlements, and a higher likelihood the activists achieve
board representation or the sale of the targeted company. Their findings suggest that pas-
sive institutional investors mitigate free-rider problems and facilitates activists’ ability to
engage in costly, value-enhancing forms of monitoring. Because they examine the relation-
ship between total fund ownership and activism event outcomes, their paper implicitly treats
passive funds as homogeneous. In this paper, I show that there is significant variation in
institutional investors’ attitudes towards shareholder activism. Furthermore, passive funds
are significantly less friendly to activists. Within the same meeting, passive funds are 30
percentage points less likely to support activists when ISS endorsed the dissident nominees
(as shown in Table A2).
Kedia et al. (2016) document that the composition of institutional ownership has a
significant impact on the likelihood of and value created from hedge fund activism. They
develop measures of institutional ownership that reflect the likelihood of activist support.
They find that activism-friendly institutional owners are associated with higher stock returns
(both short term and long term) and higher operating performance of the target firms.
Consistent with these investors being valuable to activists, they find that ownership by
activism-friendly institutions also significantly increases the likelihood of being targeted by
hedge fund activists. However, they do not explain why some institutional investors are
friendly and treat friendliness towards activists as exogenous.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper that has analyzed institutional in-
vestors voting in proxy contests is Brav et al. (2018). Similar to this paper, they find that
firm, fund, and event characteristics generate substantial heterogeneity among investors in
their support for activists. Similar to Kedia et al. (2016), their finding suggests that a rela-
tively pro-activist shareholder base is a key factor driving activists’ selection of targets. This
paper complements their results by providing an economic explanation of why institutional
investors support or oppose the activists.
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The main findings of this paper are that some investors do not have sufficient incentives
to increase firm value. This is consistent with the arguments by Bebchuk et al. (2017) that
index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to under-spend on stewardship
and side excessively with managers of corporations. Heath et al. (2018) show that passive
funds are more likely to side with management in regular proposals and director elections.
Lewellen and Lewellen (2018) directly calculate the dollar value of institutional investors’
incentives to engage and conclude that many institutions have negative incentives to increase
firm value at the expense of their holdings in rival firms. This paper is also related to the
voting behavior of institutional investors. Exercising voting rights is an important channel
of corporate governance. Iliev and Lowry (2015) show that over 25% of funds rely almost
entirely on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations, while other funds place
little weight on them. These actively voting funds are less likely to vote in a “one-size-fits-
all” manner, and they earn higher alphas, consistent with benefits from this allocation of
resources. Some activists also argue that passive institutions have a conflict of interest. In
particular, a fear of losing the business of corporate pension plans may deter such institutions
from supporting activists. On average, earnings from 401(k)-related business equal 14% of
the revenues that mutual fund families earn from their equity funds, and such income can
represent as much as 25% of fund family revenues (Davis and Kim, 2007). Since the choice
of fiduciaries for 401(k) plans lies in the hands of firm executives who may be opposed to
shareholder activism, there has been widespread suspicion that mutual funds may vote their
proxies in a conflicted manner. Iliev and Lowry (2015) conclude that the economic magnitude
of vote support from pension business ties between firms and mutual funds seems to be small.
Cvijanović et al. (2016) find that business ties significantly influence pro-management voting
at the level of individual pairs of fund families and firms after controlling for Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations and holdings.
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2.4 Common Ownership and Firm Behavior
The mechanism behind my main hypotheses is also related to the theory of Hansen
and Lott (1996) and empirical work of Azar et al. (2018). Hansen and Lott (1996) show
that shareholders that own diversified portfolios want to maximize portfolio values if com-
panies impose externalities on one another. Azar et al. (2018) find that common ownership
concentration is correlated with changes in airline ticket prices and conclude that common
ownership reduces product market competition. The evidence in Azar et al. (2018) suggests
that managers of firms in the same industry collude to maximize industry portfolio value.
In this paper, instead of assuming managerial collusion of common-held firms, I examine
activism’s effect on portfolio value from the shareholders’ perspective. I argue that institu-
tions that hold diversified portfolios are less concerned about the underperformance of target
firms because other firms in their portfolio would perform better. In this sense, this paper
is closely related to Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008), who argue that institutional investors
of acquirers do not vote against value-reducing mergers and acquisitions because they hold
shares in both acquirers and targets. Harford et al. (2011) argue that cross-holdings are too
small to have a meaningful impact on most acquisitions. They do find that cross-holdings
increased rapidly from 1985 to 2005 due to indexing and quasi-indexing. Crane et al. (2017)
show that while total institutional ownership has increased, institutional holdings have be-
come less concentrated over the past 30 years. In recent years, stock ownership by passive
institutional investors has grown rapidly (Appel et al., 2018). Passively managed mutual
funds, which seek to deliver the returns of a market index (e.g., S&P 500) or particular
investment style (e.g., large-cap value), have quadrupled their ownership share of the U.S.
stock market over the last 15 years and now account for almost half of mutual fund equity as-
sets. This paper does not suffer the criticism of Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) who aggregate
cross-holdings on firm-level and assume each institution has similar weights in acquirers and
targets. I use institution-level cross-ownership as suggested by Harford et al. (2011). The
degree of cross-ownership on the industry level is also more prevalent than that on mergers
and acquisition levels because targets and acquirers often have huge differences in size and
(passive) institutional ownership is strongly correlated with firm size.
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Using mutual fund voting data, He and Huang (2017) find evidence that aggregate cross-
ownership positively predicts management losing a vote on shareholder-sponsored governance
proposals because cross-owners internalizing corporate governance externalities and incen-
tivize them to play a more active monitoring role. The mechanism in their paper is very
different from this paper. The mechanism in their paper is that cross-owners improve the
governance of portfolio firms because, without cross-ownership, firms in the same industry
have incentives to lower their governance standard to attract managers. The existence of
institutional cross-ownership helps mitigate this race-to-bottom problem. While their paper
focuses on the externalities associated with shareholder proposals, this paper focuses on the
externalities associated with product market competition from hedge fund activism/proxy
contests. The externality of proxy contests is stronger and more plausible because the litera-
ture has found insignificant effects of shareholder proposals on firm values but found positive




I propose that the decision of institutional investors to support activists is governed
by their portfolio returns, not target firm returns alone. The table below summarizes the
spillover effects of activism events on other stakeholders. Aslan and Kumar (2016) find that
hedge fund activism on average imposes negative externalities on rivals that compete in the
same industry. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in these spillover effects, based on
rivals’ post-activism improvements, financial constraints, and the threat of being targeted by
shareholder activism. Specifically, rivals that compete on the basis of strategic substitutes
suffer from the activism events while rivals that compete on the basis of strategic complement
gain. On the other hand, rivals that compete on the basis of strategic complements and rivals
that are likely future targets of activism (and presumably had initiated proactive reforms),
improve their product market performance — after activism, consistent with findings by
Zhu (2014) and Gantchev et al. (2018).1 More importantly, Aslan and Kumar (2016) show
that financial markets appear to anticipate the spillover effects and the heterogeneity in
the post-hedge fund activism spillover effects is reflected in the announcement effects of
intervention events on rivals’ stock returns. The spillover effects can also adversely affect
other stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, and customers. This paper focuses on the
effects on rivals because the economic effects on rivals are the most significant (Aslan and
Kumar, 2016) and a comprehensive database of institutional holdings in bonds and loans is
not available.
1In the industrial organization literature, two firms compete on the basis of strategic substitutes if the
partial derivative of one firm’s sales of with respect to the other firm’s sales is negative and on the basis
of strategic complements if the partial derivative is positive. Aslan and Kumar (2016) argue that more
financially constrained rivals are more likely to compete as strategic substitutes because they are restricted
in effecting productivity and cost efficiency improvements.
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Because shareholder activism on average is associated with negative spillover effects on
target firms’ rivals, institutional investors sometimes do not benefit as much as the stock
market reactions on targets alone suggest because they frequently also own large stakes in the
target firms’ rivals. Depending on their holdings in the target and its rivals, the incentives for
institutional investors in target firms to support positive-return activism events are blunted
or even reversed. I develop my main hypothesis in the context of the voting process in proxy
contests. The major advantage of using the voting data is that it allows one to observe
the revealed preferences of institutions through their voting decisions. I use each investor’s
portfolio returns from activism events to measure her incentives to support activists. While it
is natural to assume that institutions are more likely to support the activist when the returns
are positive, this assumption holds only if assets under management are holding fixed. The
ultimate objective function for a fund family is to maximize the fees they receive from
investors. Assets under management are not only a function of returns of portfolio firms but
also a function of future investor flows. Because investors chase performance and can choose
to allocate more money to better-performing funds, institutional investors care about both
absolute and relative performance to maximize the percentage of fees multiplied by assets
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under management.2 Therefore, even if an activist creates positive value for the industry
portfolio of an institution, the returns on the institution’s holdings can still be less than the
return of the activist or other institutions. The institution still has incentives to vote against
the activist because of the potential loss of inflows in the future. Lewellen and Lewellen (2018)
directly calculate the dollar value earned by an institution from both changes in AUM and
future investor flows based on an estimated and fixed flow-to-performance sensitivity. They
find a large portion of institutional investors have negative fee incentives when target firms’
values improve at the expense of rivals. I do not intend to make restrictive assumptions
about the sensitivity and the benchmarks used to compare the performance of institutions.
Their assumptions that institutional investors earn a straight 0.5% management fee is likely
to overestimate the incentives of passive funds.3 Because the incentives from future fund
flows are a monotonically increasing function of current performance, comparing current
portfolio returns is sufficient in the context of this paper.
Business ties between mutual funds and firms also might affect institutions’ voting deci-
sions. Because the management chooses mutual funds to manage corporate pension plans,
business ties may deter mutual funds from supporting activists. On average, earnings from
401(k)-related business equal 14% of the revenues that mutual fund families earn from their
equity funds, and such income can represent as much as 25% of fund family revenues (Davis
and Kim 2007). Since the choice of fiduciaries for 401(k) plans lies in the hands of firm ex-
ecutives who may be opposed to shareholder activism, there has been widespread suspicion
that mutual funds may vote their proxies in a conflicted manner. Cvijanović et al. (2016)
find that business ties significantly influence pro-management voting at the level of individ-
ual pairs of fund families and firms after controlling for Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) recommendations. Therefore, I also control for the business ties between mutual fund
families and the target firms.
Hypothesis: The probability of voting for activists is positively related to the institu-
tions’ industry portfolio abnormal returns, controlling for business ties.
2Many papers have previously documented a strong relationship between the inflow of new investment
into a mutual fund and the fund’s past performance (Sirri and Tufano (1998),Chevalier and Ellison (1997)).
Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) show that investors use CAPM alpha to direct their capital flows.
3Wall Street Journal: Vanguard Ups the Ante in an ETF Race to Zero.
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My main hypotheses focus on examining the relationship of individual institutional in-
vestor holdings and voting behavior. Therefore, I do not control for network theory (Enriques
and Romano 2018 and Crane et al. 2017) or peer effects (Matvos and Ostrovsky 2010) that
could also explain institutional investors voting behaviors but are not captured by holdings of
individual investors. However, I do not expect this to systematically bias the results toward
my prediction because networks are identified by the similarities in institutions’ holdings.
In this paper, I use individual institutional investor’s holdings to identify their incentives,
and I would expect that institutions in the same network would vote similarly because of
the similarities in their holdings. Therefore, measuring institutional holdings individually
is similar to measuring incentives as a group. For example, activist hedge funds often im-
plicitly team up with other institutional investors to form so-called “wolf packs” (Coffee
and Palia, 2016). I expect these institutions hold significant stakes in the targets and fewer
shares in rivals that are likely to be adversely affected. Measuring holdings individually or
aggregately would yield very similar results. Consistent with this view, Crane et al. (2017)
show that clique members, identified as institutions that are connected through overlapped
holdings, vote together on proxy items. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010) use the average vote
of other funds in their estimated management-friendliness to measure peer effects. The aver-
age management-friendliness in each meeting is meeting-invariant and controlled by meeting
fixed effects in my specifications.
Institutional investors can vote differently because they process different information
sets about the proposals and make voting decisions based on private information. Large
institutional investors often directly engage with management and sometimes communicate
with dissidents before they vote. However, I don’t expect the activists’ private information
to be strongly correlated with target weights in their portfolios. The market reactions to
activism events suggest that marginal investors view them as value-increasing. If institutions
have a lower valuation of activists’ proposals than the marginal investors, they could choose
to sell target firms at market prices rather than opposing the activists.
My hypothesis also assumes that the institutions’ portfolio returns explain their voting
decisions and ignore the risk of the proposals. It is possible that the proposals by the activists
are riskier, and the higher returns justify the risk being taken. If institutional investors are
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more risk-averse than the activists, they may still oppose the activists. This will bias against
my hypothesis because a more diversified investor should care less about idiosyncratic risk
and support riskier projects while a more concentrated investor would care more about id-
iosyncratic risk and oppose riskier projects. I do not include control variables for the riskiness
of the proposals or the degree of risk aversions of institutional investors because of the lack
of good proxies. I do implicitly control for the risk of the proposals by including meeting
fixed effects and the institution’s risk aversion by including institution fixed effects.
If activist campaigns impose negative externalities on other holdings of an institution,
the institution may take other actions to mitigate the impact. This paper studies voting
decisions because exercising voting rights has no additional costs for existing shareholders.
The other more costly actions are subject to cost-benefit analysis and are beyond the scope
of this paper.
In my empirical analysis, I mainly focus on the cases in which institutional investor dis-
agree with the recommendation of the leading proxy advisor, ISS (Institutional Shareholder
Services). The analytic framework of ISS focuses ”on the question of which nominees are nec-
essary to drive the appropriate change in the board room, not the larger question of what the
optimal selection, out of all available nominees, might be.” ISS, therefore, purportedly makes
conservative recommendations in proxy contests. Some also may argue that ISS recommen-
dations are biased. The main conflict of interest of ISS is that ISS also offers consulting
services to corporate clients. However, if so, this will bias ISS in favor of management who
have business relationships or potentially offer business to ISS in the future, not the activists.
The major proxy advisors also devote substantial efforts in each proxy contest and provide
very detailed analysis. Consistent with this view, Alexander et al. (2010) find that proxy
advice in proxy contests is both predictive about contest outcomes and informative about
the ability of dissidents to add value. ISS also could cater their recommendations based on
its large clients’ preferences. Contrary to this argument, I find that large institutions are
less likely to follow ISS recommendations. Also, my empirical design uses within-meeting
variation in voting only, and the recommendations are controlled by including meeting fixed
effects.
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3.2 Sample and Empirical Design
3.2.1 Sample construction for activism targets
The sample of shareholder activism target firms is based mostly on Schedule 13D filings,
the mandatory federal securities law filings under Section 13(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act
that investors must file with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring more than 5% of any
class of securities of a publicly-traded company if they have an interest in influencing the
management of the company. In some cases, activists target large-cap companies and hold
less than 5%, so no 13D is filed. I do a news search to identify events in which the activists
hold less than 5% and add these events to the sample.4 I identify proxy contests from 2009 to
2017 by preliminary proxy statements in connection with contested solicitations (PREC14A)
and definitive proxy statements in connection with contested solicitations (DEFC14A) from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Alexander et al. (2010) use a similar approach to identify proxy
contests. Figure 3 summarizes the number of activism events and proxy fights launched, as
well as the outcomes of these proxy fights. On average there are 267 activism events per
year from 2009 to 2017 and about a third of them resulted in proxy contests.
The outcome of proxy fights is endogenous. As shown in Figure 3, in about half of the
proxy contests, dissidents withdraw their proposals, or the management settled most likely
because the probability of winning is very low. In the voting sample, I can observe voting
decisions in events that went to vote and some settlements (because management has more
information about voting outcomes (Bach and Metzger, 2016) and chooses to settle when
they were likely to lose). Many event-specific characteristics may lead to the outcome of a
voted proxy contest. To address this concern, my empirical design mainly uses the within-
meeting variation, and the external validity of using announcement returns is examined in
Section 3.3.5.
I collect data on proxy advisor recommendations in proxy contests through a news search
4For cases in which activists hold less than 5%, I search only for activism events launched by hedge funds
that are identified by Factiva. The list of hedge funds and campaigns from 1994 to 2014 are provided by
Professor Alon Brav. Later years in the sample I follow Aslan and Kumar (2016) and perform searches for
the text strings ’activism,’ ’activist,’ ’shareholder activist,’ ’shareholder activism,’ and hedge fund names.
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through Factiva using the combination of target firm names and proxy advisor names during
periods of activism campaigns. I search for news about two major proxy advisors, ISS and
Glass Lewis, on their recommendations for each proxy contest. These two proxy advisors
conduct extensive research on contested directors and make voting recommendations on a
case-by-case basis.5 Alexander et al. (2010) show that voting advice is informative about
the ability of dissidents to add value and this is also consistent with the positive stock price
reactions for campaigns backed by ISS and ex-post improvement in operational performance
(Brav et al. (2008b), Bebchuk et al. (2015), Brav et al. (2015b). There is little variation
in voting when the proxy advisors endorse the management. Therefore, I test my main
hypothesis using a sample of proxy contests in which ISS endorsed the activists. There are
67 such proxy contests out of a total of 113 contests from July 2013 to June 2017.6
Institutional investors’ voting records in proxy contests are hand-collected. Specifically,
mutual funds voting records are collected from SEC EDGAR N-PX filings and pension
funds voting records are obtained from pension fund websites or the funds in response to
my requests under the Freedom of Information Act.7 The SEC Form N-PX is completed by
mutual funds to disclose procedures for proxy votes. The form is filed each year with the
SEC for the trailing-12-month period ending on June 30. I collected voting records for 186
institutions (167 mutual fund families and 19 pension funds) and their voting decisions in 113
proxy contests from July 2013 to June 2017.8 Following Alexander et al. (2010), the support
for the activists is defined as follows: a vote from an institutional investor is considered
pro-dissident if the institutional investor votes the dissident proxy card (selects at least one
dissident nominee), and a vote from an institutional investor is considered pro-management
if the institutional investor votes the management proxy card (selects none of the dissident
5The detailed analysis for the DuPont proxy contest with Trian Fund Management is publicly available
(https://www.issgovernanceċom/file/publications/dupont ssr.pdf). In Appendix A, I attached the voting
guideline of ISS US for contested director elections.
6The sample starts in July to match the reporting period of voting records from N-PX filings.
7According to ISS, ISS Voting Analytics, a database widely used in the literature to study mutual fund
voting, the collection of proxy contest records historically is on a “best-efforts” basis, with no guarantee that
it comprises all proxy contests. For pension funds, I use the largest 1,000 retirement funds ranking from
Pensions&Investments magazine and choose the largest ones in North America.
8There are other smaller institutions voting in this sample period, but they are unlikely to participate
in more than five proxy contests in the sample period based on their 13F filings. Because my empirical
design uses institution fixed effects and smaller institutions have limited within-fund variation, the exclusion
of smaller institutions would not affect my results.
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nominees). I measure voting decisions on the institutional level for each fund family because
institutions have corporate governance teams and proxy voting committees to oversee funds’
voting decisions.9 Morningstar (2017) surveys the 12 largest providers of index funds and
exchange-traded funds across the U.S., Europe, and Asia and finds that firms that offer both
actively managed and index-tracking strategies apply their voting policies universally to all
portfolios, irrespective of investment style.10 What’s more, fund managers within the same
fund family can also coordinate their votes.11
3.2.2 Sample construction for rival firms
Similar to the literature on the competitive effects of financial events (Lang and Stulz,
1992) and the literature on the spillover effects of shareholder activism (Aslan and Kumar,
2016; Gantchev et al., 2018), I identify rival firms as all other firms in the same four-digit
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code on Compustat.12 To avoid any selection bias,
in the rival sample for each year, I include those firms that were future targets of activism
events. I use two filters to allow meaningful analysis. First, following Aslan and Kumar
(2016), I retain firm-years with available industry classification information (four-digit SIC
codes). Second, I exclude firms without complete data around the event date on the CRSP
Daily Returns file.
I also use the 10-K Text-based Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) data (calibrated
to be “as granular” as three-digit SIC codes) from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) to
identify rivals of target firms. TNIC is a network method of identifying competitors of each
firm. Competitors are firms residing in close proximity in product space to each firm based
9I discuss institutional details of mutual fund voting on the fund-family level in Appendix B.
10It should be noted that most of these firms also operate an active fund business, which—in some
cases—may be much larger than their passive one. Collectively, the surveyed firms have over $20 trillion of
assets under management.
11Wall Street Journal: Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors. In the voting of the
merger between Towers Watson and Willis Group, ”BlackRock’s passive team leaned toward voting no, but
portfolio managers at the firm’s actively managed funds backed the deal, arguing that it would create more
long-term value, said people familiar with the matter. The active managers persuaded their colleagues to do
the same.”
12For conglomerates such as DuPont, I also use segment SIC code from Compustat Historical Segments
data to identify competitors. A firm is classified as a conglomerate firm if less than 50% of its sales are in
one segment.
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on a continuous measure of similarity. Another benefit of TNIC industries is that industry
composition is updated annually, and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) find that the product
market space dynamically changes over time.
One caveat of TNIC data is that the TNIC data do not include rivals that do not file 10-K
filings. Many industries compete internationally. ”Foreign private issuers” with listed equity
shares on exchanges in the United States file 20-F forms instead of 10-K forms. Therefore,
these firms are not included in the TNIC data. For example, Casablanca Capital LP targeted
Cliffs Natural Resources in 2014, the largest and oldest independent iron ore mining company
in the United States. The activist described its U.S. business as “low risk” and wanted to
separate its international and domestic assets to better compete in the seaborne iron ore
market. Rio Tinto Group and BHP Billiton are the major competitors in the seaborne
iron ore market and are also publicly listed and held by many large institutional investors.
However, these two firms are not in the Hoberg and Phillips industry classification data
because they do not file 10-K filings. I use the SIC code for my main results because it
contains a more comprehensive set of rivals than the TNIC dataset.
3.2.3 Measures of major channels
3.2.3.1 Direct incentives for institutional investors to support activists To test
my main hypothesis, I use the returns of institutions to measure their incentives to support
activists. Specifically, for each institution, I calculate its holdings in the target firm and
the target firms’ rivals in the quarter immediately before the meeting date. To measure an
institution’s ex-ante incentive to vote for the activist, I use the 13D announcement returns
of the target firms and its rivals to proxy for the impact on these firms if the activists
were to win. I then calculate the returns for each institution that voted in the annual
meeting. The returns are a proxy for expected gains from activism events. For events with
higher probabilities of success or higher potential benefits, the returns are likely to be higher.
Therefore, I use the meeting fixed effects to control for these meeting-invariant characteristics
and compare returns within each meeting to predict institutions’ voting behaviors. Another
assumption is that the plans that activists disclosed do not change significantly over time.
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Activist hedge funds conduct extensive research on target firms and often disclose their plans
after discussions with the management. I find no significant differences between the plan
that the activists first announced and initiatives in proxy filings before the proxy contests.
This is also consistent with the view that if the activists significantly change their plans, it
signals to outsiders that they do not have a clear plan and would not help them to convince
other shareholders.
An alternative way to measure shareholders’ incentives is to use the market reactions
to the annual meeting outcomes. Because the meeting date is closer to the holdings record
date, it might offer a better estimation of the market’s expectations. In the DuPont case,
DuPont had a -6.73% abnormal return and Monsanto had a 1.88% abnormal return in a
two-day window around the date that the director election results were disclosed. However,
there are some concerns with using this measure. First of all, using market reactions from
election results works if the market has not anticipated the outcome, but it’s not clear
when the information about the outcome is publicly available. Bach and Metzger (2016)
show that real-time voting data can be accessed through Broadridge Financial Solutions, a
United States-based corporate services company. Because management has access to the data
through Broadridge, they find that voting outcomes are manipulated by the management.
Many settlements between management and activists happen before the actual meeting date,
which suggests that information about the final voting outcome is leaked before the actual
meeting dates. Second, some short-term investors might choose to exit their positions in
anticipation of the exit of the activists.13 The exit may put price pressures on target firm
stocks and make the estimation of returns noisier. What’s more, the activists can also
choose to stay and try to influence the firms’ decisions even though they lose the proxy
contests. In the Trian-DuPont case, Trian did not choose to exit and continued to influence
the management after DuPont merged with Dow Chemical. This is, in fact, contradictory to
the market expectation. Therefore, using market reactions of proxy contest results does not
provide a clean setting to estimate the impact because interpretations of market expectations
are complicated by many possibilities. The 13D announcement returns appear to offer a much
cleaner estimation because the abnormal returns reflect only one piece of new information.
13Wall Street Journal: DuPont Shares Tread Water Since Shareholder Vote - Market Talk. 18 May 2015
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Institutional ownership data is obtained from 13F filings retrieved from SEC EDGAR.
The SEC requires all institutions with at least $100 million in total holdings to file a 13F
form within 45 calendar days of quarter-end. The Thomson-Reuters dataset is known to
be incomplete and contains various inaccuracies. To improve its accuracy, I download 13F
filings from SEC EDGAR and then match the manager number from the Thomson 13F
database with the CIKs from 13F filings to make sure that the two databases offer the same
holding information in the sample period. I also follow Azar et al. (2018) and Ben-David
et al. (2018) and combine holdings from separate filings by the same asset managers in this
paper.14 Since there are no identifiers of institutions to link the voting and holding data, I
manually match the two datasets by institution names.
I calculate each institution’s portfolio return as the value-weighted average abnormal





The timelines below illustrate the timing of each variable measured.
If the 13D date and meeting date are in different quarters:
Or if the 13D date and meeting date are in the same quarter:
14For example, in 13F filings, Blackrock discloses the holdings by its various subsidiaries in seven different
CIK reporting entities or registrants, reflecting various affiliated entities and financial management arms. I
aggregate holdings of seven 13F filings to BlackRock’s holdings.
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The rationale to use returns is that the stock market reacts significantly when activists
announce their plans for both targets (Brav et al. 2008a) and their rivals (Aslan and Kumar
2016). More importantly, stock market reactions capture both negative and positive spillover
effects on the rival firms. I use the market reactions as proxies for the potential benefits and
costs of activism events if the activists succeed. I exclude the rivals’ returns if there are
other confounding events of rivals within the three days of the 13D announcement dates of
the target. The confounding events include earnings announcements, and major corporate
transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs. The main results are similar if I
also include firms with possible confounding events.
Institutions can choose to change holdings after the initial announcements and before
the annual meeting dates.15 For example, 13D Management LLC, an investment advisor,
specializes in a trading strategy that follows activists. He and Li (2018) find that actively-
managed funds whose managers are socially connected to activists are more likely to increase
holdings in target stocks during activist campaigns. I use institutional holdings before the
meeting dates to calculate the value-weighted industry portfolio return. In this paper, I do
not intend to study how the ownership equilibrium changes around activism events. If the
institutional investors adjust their holdings, I expect that the holdings before the meeting
dates serve as better proxies for their incentives. In one of the robustness tests, I also use
holdings before the 13D announcement dates, and the results are similar.
3.2.3.2 Indirect incentives for institutional investors to support activists I col-
lect data on 401(k) retirement plans sponsored by publicly traded firms from Forms 5500
filed with the Department of Labor (DOL). These data provide detailed information on
any business relationship between a firm and a fund pertaining to the firm’s pension plan
15The average time between the 13D filing dates and the proxy contest meeting dates is six months, and
the median is four months in my voting sample.
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(e.g., investment advisor, trustee, investment manager, etc.). Any firm that sponsors an
employee benefit plan that qualifies under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) Sections 104 or 4065 must file Form 5500 with the DOL. Benefits provided by a
firm’s plan include pension and welfare benefits. I match target firms in this sample by
the EIN (Employer Identification Number) provided in Forms 5500. Due to the lack of a
unique common mutual fund (or family) identifier, I manually match fund families by their
names to the voting and ownership data sets. I define a business tie as a continuous variable
log(1+compensation). Compensation is the total compensation received by fund families for
services rendered in relation to 401(k) plans as the sum of direct and indirect compensation
and 0.5% of assets under management (Davis and Kim, 2007).
3.2.4 Empirical design
The main prediction of this paper is that institutions that benefit less from the activism
events are less likely to support the activists. Specifically, I run the following specifications
to test my first hypothesis for each institution i voting in shareholder meeting m.





µm + µi + εim
V oteim is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the institution i supports the activist
in the meeting m, and 0 otherwise. Following Alexander et al. (2010), the support for
the activists is defined as follow: a vote from an institutional investor is considered pro-
dissident if the institutional investor votes the dissident proxy card (selects at least one
dissident nominee), and a vote from an institutional investor is considered pro-management
if the institutional investor votes the management proxy card (selects none of the dissident
nominees). Rim is the return of institution i in meeting m as defined in Section 3.2.3.1.
BusinessT iesim is a continuous variable log(1 + compensation) in which compensation is
defined as the total compensation received by fund families for services rendered in relation
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to 401(k) plans as the sum of direct and indirect compensation and 0.5% of assets under
management. µi and µm denote institution fixed effects and meeting fixed effects. β1 is
the coefficient of interest. My hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between Rim and
V oteim.
3.3 Main Results
3.3.1 Dispersion in Institutions’ support for activists in proxy contests and
univariate tests
The summary statistics for the voting data are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. In
Table 2, I report how often institutional investors vote differently from the recommendations
of proxy advisors. Section 1 in Panel A shows that institutional investors, on average, voted
against activists in more than 50% of the cases. Sections 2, 3, and 4 are split based on
recommendations from proxy advisors. To what extent the institutions agree with the two
leading proxy advisors is different. Specifically, in about 20% to 25% of the cases where
institutions voted against activists when dissidents are endorsed by proxy advisors. On the
other hand, institutions seldom side with activists when management is endorsed by the
proxy advisors (the average unconditional probability is below 5%). In Table 2, I split the
sample based on the size of the institutions in my sample. Large mutual funds on average
are about 7% more likely to reject the activists compare to other funds while there is no
significant difference between large pension funds and smaller pension funds.16 Overall,
institutional investors are more management friendly, and this observation brings the main
research question of this paper: why do institutional investors often reject the activists when
their actions are viewed as value-increasing to the target firms?
Table 3 reports the number of proxy contests large mutual funds and pension funds voted
in, how many times they voted against the activists, and the percentage of voting against
the activists. As shown in Table A1, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, the Big 3
16One possible explanation is that many pension funds directly invest in activist hedge funds. Because
13F filings do not include holdings in hedge funds, I do not test this conjecture in this paper.
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institutions that dominate the index fund industry, have the majority of assets under man-
agement managed passively in their mutual fund products. Therefore, these three indexers
are expected to hold more diversified portfolios, and they also cannot adjust their holdings
because of institutional constraints. According to my hypothesis, a more diversified investor
does not earn as much return as an investor that holds a concentrated position in the target
and therefore has weaker incentives to support the activists. Consistent with my hypothesis,
large indexers, such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, voted against the activists
in more than 50% of the cases even when ISS supports the activists. These large indexers
are less friendly to activists than large stock pickers, such as Fidelity and Capital Group. In
Table A2, I show that within the same meeting, passive mutual fund families are 30 percent-
age points more likely to vote against the activists. These results are also broadly consistent
with Brav et al. (2018) who find that index funds are less likely to support activists in proxy
contests.
I conduct univariate tests to examine the relationship between institutions’ industry
portfolio returns and their propensity to support the activists. In Table 4, I calculate the
13D announcement return of target companies and their rivals. Consistent with prior lit-
erature, target firms experienced significant and positive abnormal returns around the 13D
announcement dates. Target firms, on average, gain abnormal returns of about 3.5%, sug-
gesting that the market views these events to be value-increasing. On the other hand, rivals
defined by the TNIC definition on average experience market-adjusted abnormal returns of
-0.35% and rivals defined by the 4-digit SIC code on average experience abnormal returns of
-0.16%. However, these effects are smaller than the large positive announcement effects of
hedge fund activism for target firms reported by Brav et al. (2008a). These results thus sug-
gest substantial heterogeneity in the announcement effects across various types of rivals and
industries, which is consistent with the empirical evidence in Aslan and Kumar (2016). In
Table A4, I replicate results found by Aslan and Kumar (2016). Activism events associated
with business strategy or operations on average are associated with lower rival returns; more
financially-constrained rivals with higher leverage and lower cash holdings suffer more from
the activism events. The events with objectives to improve business strategy or operations
also receive lower support from institutional investors. However, there could be some unob-
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servable event-variant characteristics that can explain the differences. Even if the spillover
effect is zero, a dilution also will make a diversified investor benefit much less. Therefore,
my main empirical tests only use within-meeting variations.
I then calculate institutions’ portfolio returns and sort them into deciles. Because there
is significant variation among institutions in their relative holdings in targets and their
rivals, institutions that are in the top decile of potential returns (column (1)) earn about
6.5 percentage points more abnormal returns than intuitions that in the bottom decile of
potential returns column (3)) and the difference ((1)-(3)) is statistically significant at 1%
level. Consistent with my prediction, institutions in the top decile of expected benefits
(column (2)) are about 12 percentage points less likely to vote against the activists than
institutions that are in the bottom decile of expected benefits (column (4)) and the difference
((2)-(4)) is statistically significant at 1%. The economic magnitude is also significant. The
difference in the probability of voting against the activists between the two groups accounts
for 50% of the 24% unconditional rejection rate.
In Figure 5, I group industry portfolio returns in 10 bins and plot the average support
rate of institutions in each bin. The results are also consistent with the findings in Table 4.
Funds that have higher industry portfolio returns are more likely to vote for activists. In
Figure 2A, I show that the relationship is similar when I use the sub-sample of events that
have higher than the sample median 13D announcement return (2.815%). This confirms the
latter results that the main results still hold with meeting fixed effects, so the relationship
is not driven by the subsample of events that have lower 13D announcement returns.
3.3.2 Industry portfolio returns and probability of voting for activists in proxy
contests
Univariate tests on industry portfolio returns and the probability of voting for the ac-
tivists have revealed that there is a positive correlation between the two. I further test my
first hypothesis in a multivariate setting controlling for business ties and various fixed effects.
I use a linear probability model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable in-
dicating the vote of each institution (1 if the institution votes for the activist in the meeting,
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and 0 if the institution votes against the activists). The business tie measure is a contin-
uous variable log(1+compensation) where compensation is the total compensation received
by fund families for services rendered in relation to 401(k) plans as the sum of direct and
indirect compensation and 0.5% of assets under management. The industry portfolio return
is measured on SIC 4-digit level for each institution-meeting pair. I use the market-adjusted
abnormal returns over the (-1,1) window as in Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008). An alternative
way to measure returns is to use longer return windows, e.g., from the announcement date
until the voting date. This has the benefit of incorporating all information available to the
shareholders when casting their vote but also has the disadvantage of incorporating a sub-
stantial amount of information unrelated to the proxy contest. In my case, the disadvantage
seems to outweigh the benefit because measurement errors would exacerbate attenuation
bias. In the body of this paper, I use the shorter (-1,1) window.17
Table 5 presents the main results of the multivariate model. The results show that
there is a significant positive association between the instructions’ industry portfolio returns
and the probability of voting for the activists. Because some funds do not have enough
incentives to make independent decisions and tend to follow recommendations from proxy
advisors (Iliev and Lowry, 2015), there is a significant portion of funds that seldom voted
against the activists as shown in the distribution of funds’ vote in Figure A1. The estimates
from fixed-effects models are less significant because there is a lack of within-fund variation
in these funds. Therefore, I restrict the sample to frequent voters (institutions that have
voted greater than or equal to 40 times in proxy contests from 2013 to 2017) and repeat the
analysis in Panel B. Not surprisingly, the economic magnitude becomes slightly larger and
all coefficients are positive and significant. A one standard deviation increase in industry
portfolio return increases the probability of voting for the activists by 3.8%, which is about
16% of the unconditional rejection rate 24%.
Realized firm announcement returns incorporate salient information about institutions’
incentives to support the activists. However, their magnitudes are plagued with an en-
17The standard errors become larger in Table A7 and Table A8 when I use the longer (-1,5) window and
(-10,10) window. However, my results that, within a meeting, funds with higher returns are more likely to
vote “for” remains valid and statistically significant at the 5% level. This is not surprising, because meeting
fixed effects absorb the additional noise in each industry introduced by the longer windows.
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dogeneity problem, because they depend on the expected probability of activists’ success,
which itself depends on institutions’ voting and their attitudes toward the activists. This
endogeneity problem should be mitigated in the meeting fixed effects specification, in which
the fixed effects absorb the average return to the institution and with it some of the common
component of the feedback from expected votes on returns. Meeting fixed effects also control
for any meeting-invariant characteristics, such as the target company’s prior stock/operating
performance, the activist’s ownership, the incumbent’s ownership, the quality of the activists’
proposals, and the qualification of the director nominees. Column 3 shows that for a given
proxy contest, institutions with higher industry portfolio returns are more likely to vote for
activists.
In column 4, I also control for institution fixed effects, which control for institutions’ aver-
age propensities to support activists or follow proxy advisors’ recommendations. The results
remain quantitatively similar. In column 5, I use both meeting fixed effects and institution
fixed effects to control for heterogeneity across each proxy contest and each institution. In
this specification, I compare two institutions that voted in the same meeting but realized
different returns from the activism event while controlling for their average propensities to
support the activists. The results still hold with this most restricted specification. Overall,
the multivariate results show a strong positive association between the probability of voting
for the activists and institutions’ industry portfolio returns.
3.3.3 Robustness
I conduct a battery of robustness tests for the main results. The first robustness test
I conduct is to use an alternative definition of industry rivals. I also use 10-K Text-based
Network Industry Classifications (TNIC) data (calibrated to be “as granular” as three-digit
SIC codes) from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) to define competitors of targets. The TNIC
definition allows product market definitions to change every year and relax the membership
transitivity requirement of fixed industry classifications. The main caveat of the TNIC
definition is that foreign firms that do not file 10-K filings are excluded even though they are
in the Compustat database. In Table 6, I repeat the tests in Table 5 using TNIC to define
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industries. Since the TNIC data is calibrated to be “as granular” as three-digit SIC codes,
it could exacerbate the measurement error problem in returns. In Panel A of Table 6, the
coefficients on industry portfolio return are positive but not significant. When I restrict the
sample to frequent voters in Panel B of Table 6, coefficients on industry portfolio returns
are also positive and significant and the economic magnitudes also become larger when I
use meeting fixed effects to absorb the noise common to all firms in the same industry as
the target. In Panel C and Panel D, I repeat the analysis in Panel A and Panel B, but the
definition of rivals is restricted to the ”nearest 20” rivals measured by the similarity scores
provided in the TNIC dataset. The results are stronger in these specifications when only the
closest rivals are included.
In the second robustness test, I run the main specification using the full sample and
control for ISS and Glass Lewis recommendations, while in Table 5 the sample is conditional
on ISS backing the directors nominated by the activists. Consistent with the view that
proxy advisors have a significant impact on institutional investors’ voting decisions, the
ISS endorsement of the activists increases the probability of voting for activists by 54.5
percentage points, and Glass Lewis endorsement of the activists increases the probability of
voting for activist by 21.5 percentage points. The magnitude of coefficients is consistent with
the fact that ISS and Glass Lewis have 61% and 37% of the market share for proxy advisory
services, respectively.18 Controlling for proxy advisor recommendations does not affect the
main results and the coefficients on industry portfolio return are positive and significant
when also controlling for institution fixed effects. The results in Panel C and Panel D when
using TNIC to identify rivals are also similar to the results in Table 6.
In the third robustness test, I use institutional holdings immediately before the an-
nouncement dates to measure the institutions’ incentives. The way I design my empirical
measure of portfolio returns is to address the possibility that institutions can change their
holdings in targets and their rivals if the plans proposed by activists adversely affect their
portfolio returns. Institutions may invest more in target firms and less in their rivals. While
the main research question of this paper is not to study how shareholder activism affects
18Source: Center On Executive Compensation (http://www.execcomp.org/Issues/Issue/proxy-advisory-
firms)
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the time-series changes of institutional holdings or ownership structure equilibrium, such a
possibility is still consistent with my prediction that an institution’s voting decision depends
on its portfolio holdings. Unlike the DuPont case in which it took almost two years for the
activists to launch a proxy fight, the median time between the 13D dates and the meeting
dates is only four months for my sample. I use institutional holdings at the end of the quar-
ter immediately before the meeting dates because they are better to measure institutional
investors’ incentives. In addition to the main results, I run the same tests using the holdings
in the quarters immediately before the 13D announcement dates in Table A6 as opposed
to using holdings in the quarter immediately before the annual meeting dates in Table 5.
The results in Table A6 are quantitatively similar to previous results, suggesting that the
time-series changes in institutional holdings do not systematically affect my main results.
This is also consistent with the view that passive investors who are not able to freely adjust
their portfolio holdings tend to vote against the activists. What’s more, seventy percent of
the institutions in my sample are classified as quasi-indexers or dedicated institutions by
Bushee (1998) and have low portfolio turnover ratios. The economic magnitude is slightly
lower in Table A6 because holdings closer to meeting dates serve as better proxies for insti-
tutions’ incentives. In untabulated results, I find that the total ownership of institutions in
my sample is stable over time around activism events, and so is the number of institutions.
I also find that the correlation between institutional ownership in target firms (fraction of
target firm value in the institution’s industry portfolio) before 13D announcement dates and
annual meeting dates is about 90%, and fewer than 5% of institution-meeting observations
have significant time-series changes. Therefore, my results remain robust when I use insti-
tutional holdings before the 13D announcement dates. This is also consistent with Li and
Schwartz-Ziv (2018) who find that mutual funds sell their positions if their votes are opposite
to the voting outcome and there is no abnormal trading volume around the record dates.
The portfolio choices of institutional investors are, of course, endogenous. Activist in-
vestors are contrarian investors and pick under-performing targets. Other institutional in-
vestors might be momentum investors and invest firms that are generating higher returns.
Studying the ownership structure of firms in proxy contests is beyond the scope of this
paper, and I will leave this question for future research. In this paper, I take holdings as
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given because of the lack of time-series changes. One might expect that institutional in-
vestors trade on information related to activism events and earn trading profits. Given that
most institutions put in very limited resources in corporate governance (Bebchuk and Hirst,
2018a), it is unsurprising that most institutions don’t actively trade on activism events.19
The event information is likely to be learned when the proxy advisors provide institutions
with summarized reports shortly before the meeting dates, and voting decisions are made
thereafter.20
The fourth robustness test is related to the econometric model. In the body of the paper,
I use OLS throughout, which gives consistent and easily interpretable estimates under a
broader set of conditions and requires less restrictive assumptions about the error term. I
also repeat tests in Table 5 in Table A9 using conditional logit models with fixed effects.
The results remain similar.
Last but not least, the results are also robust when using different factor models to
calculate abnormal returns. I follow Aslan and Kumar (2016) and use market-adjusted
returns for the main results. The results are quantitatively similar if I use the market-model
and the Fama and French 3-factor-model. These results are not reported in this paper.
3.3.4 Probability of voting for the activists when the target firm has no publicly-
traded competitors
If the adverse effects on target firms’ rivals is an important factor when a cross-owner
decides to vote for or against the activists, I would expect activists that target firms with
no publicly-traded rivals to receive significantly more support from other investors because
investors are unlikely to be affected by the negative externalities from activism events. In
the sample, there is one target, Sotheby’s, that can be used to test this prediction.
Sotheby’s is one of the world’s largest brokers of fine and decorative art, jewelry, real
estate, and collectibles. In May 2013, Third Point filed a 13F form showing new position in
19For example, Vanguard has over $5 trillion dollars in assets but only have a twenty to thirty people
corporate governance team.
20Iliev et al. (2018) find that passive indexer investors perform less research on their portfolio companies.
In the SEC roundtable on November 15, 2018, institutional investors mention that they rely on the proxy
advisor reports as an important source of information because they lack the governance resources to perform
detailed research.
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Sotheby’s, and Third Point had its first meeting with Sotheby’s to discuss opportunities for
improvement in August. On February 27th, 2014, Daniel Loeb, founder and chief executive
of Third Point, launched a proxy contest to nominate himself and two others to the board
of Sotheby’s Inc. Loeb argued that Sotheby’s had fallen behind rival Christie’s International
PLC in selling contemporary art and pressured the auctioneer to focus more on its compet-
itive position and management. Shareholders voted in favor of Loeb, and the board agreed
to appoint Loeb and two allies to its board. Sotheby’s shares closed up 3.25% on the day
the settlement was announced.21
In its 10-K filings, Sotheby’s says its primary global competitor is Christie’s International,
PLC, a privately held, French-owned, auction house. To a much lesser extent, Sotheby’s also
faces competition from smaller auction houses such as Bonhams and Phillips, as well as
regional auction houses and a variety of art dealers across all collecting categories. In the
Chinese art market, Sotheby’s also competes with Beijing Poly International Auction Co.
Ltd., China Guardian Auctions Co. Ltd., and Beijing Hanhai Auction Co. Ltd.
None of the competitors mentioned in the 10-K filings of Sotheby’s is publicly traded
in the U.S. Christie’s is owned by Groupe Artémis, the holding company of François-Henri
Pinault and his family. Bonhams is owned by chairman Robert Brooks and the Dutch
Louwmans family. Phillips was purchased by a Russian private company, Mercury Group.
Beijing Hanhai Auction Co. Ltd is a Chinese state-owned enterprise. China Guardian
Auctions Co. Ltd is privately held by Jade Group, the holding company of Dongsheng
Chen. Beijing Poly International Auction Co. Ltd is held by Poly Culture Group Corp,
which is listed in Hong Kong. Therefore, it is unlikely the institutions in my sample also
hold significant numbers of shares in rivals of Sotheby’s.
In Table 7, I test this prediction formally. I use a dummy variable, no public-traded com-
petitors, to denote institution-meeting pair observations from the Sotheby’s proxy contest.
The coefficient on the no public-traded competitors is positive and significant. The results
show that institutions are about 10% more likely to support the activists when the target
does not have publicly-traded competitors, which is over 40% of the average 25% rejection
21Wall Street Journal: Sotheby’s, Third Point Reach Settlement (https://www.wsj.com/articles/sothebys-
third-point-reach-accord-1399295718)
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rate. The results still hold when I use institution fixed effects to control for institutions’
propensity to support the activists or follow proxy advisor recommendations. Because the
dummy is meeting-invariant, I cannot use meeting fixed effects specification here. Therefore,
I cannot rule out that there are other event-specific characteristics that make institutions
more likely to support the activist. In column 4, I control for target firm’s 13D announcement
return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, previous stock return, leverage, dividend yield, institutional own-
ership, and dissident group ownership and the coefficient remains significant. I argue that
the results are consistent with my hypothesis, but I do not claim causality in this context.
3.3.5 Market reactions of activism events
In this section, I first examine whether market reactions of activism events on targets
are different for events that ended up in proxy contests and events that did not. The results
are presented in Panel A of Table 8. Events that ended up in proxy fights have slightly
higher market reactions than other events, suggesting that these events are expected to
create higher value to offset the additional costs of launching proxy fights. The differences
are significant only when using the (-20,20 window). These results help to alleviate the
concern of the external validity of the results. The abnormal returns from proxy contest
events are not systematically different from other events. Even though my results are from
a sample of proxy contests, it is reasonable to assume that they have broader implications
for other activism campaigns as well.
In Panel B, I examine whether the market reactions differ for proxy contests in which
activists won and those in which the activists lost. Although the abnormal returns on
average are higher for proxy contests in which activists eventually obtained board seats, the
differences are not significantly different. This is consistent with the view that there is high
uncertainty for proxy contests, and the market does not predict the outcomes precisely. In
Figure 3, I show that the success rate in proxy contests is around 50%. This suggests that
the activists may endogenously select targets so that the equilibrium expected benefits for
both types are the same. If ex-ante activists expect that some campaigns are more likely
to fail, they would avoid launching these campaigns in the first place. In equilibrium, the
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average market reactions should not be significantly different. This is also consistent with
the findings by Keida et al. (2016) and Brav et al. (2018) that friendliness of shareholder
bases is an important determinant when activists select target firms. These results also
confirm that my main results are not driven by the correlation between higher returns and
higher probabilities of success, which is also correlated with the support of large institutional
investors. In Panel C, I repeat the analysis for the events in the voting sample, and the results
are quantitatively similar.
3.3.6 Do proxy contests have an impact on target firm values?
Boyson and Pichler (2018) show that when hedge funds counter-resist with proxy fights,
the impact of hostile target resistance is reversed, and these campaigns have similar outcomes
to campaigns without hostile target resistance. In this section, I test whether winning or
losing a proxy contest has real effects on target firms’ stock prices and operating performance.
3.3.6.1 Abnormal returns around the voting results dates of close-call proxy
contests To examine the market reactions to the outcomes of proxy contests, I use a
sample of close-call proxy contests to examine the abnormal returns around voting results
dates. Because in these events, the outcomes are unlikely to be precisely predicted before the
results are revealed, the abnormal returns provide useful information about how the market
views the potential value added by activists. Activists won 75% of the proxy contests in
which ISS endorsed the activists. For failed proxy contests, there are nine events in which
the vote differences between the management nominee with the lowest support and dissident
nominee with the highest support are very close. For the successful proxy contest, there are
three close-call events. I define a proxy contest as close-call if the vote difference is smaller
than three percentage point. Because the result of a close-call vote is akin to a random
outcome, stock price reactions around voting result dates enable me to identify the effects
of proxy contests on target firms and their rivals. In Table 9 Panel A, I show that target
firms experienced significant negative returns when learning about the news of the activists’
failure. On the other hand, rival firms experienced zero to positive and significant returns
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when rivals are defined by 4-digit SIC code and TNIC, respectively. There exists a return
reversal for both target and rival firms around 13D announcement dates and voting result
dates when the activists lost. While losing the proxy contest is a setback for activists, the
activist can still exert influence without board seats. For example, in the DuPont and Trian
case mentioned in the introduction, Trian lost the proxy contest but chose to stay with
the company and kept influencing the management later. Trian successfully persuaded the
management of DuPont to spin-off some units and merge with Dow Chemical. While the
return reversals are consistent with the main results of this paper, return reversals are not
necessarily a prediction from the main hypothesis. In Panel B of Table 9, I show that the
market reacts positively when the activists won the close-call elections. For rival firms, their
market returns around the voting result dates are negative but not significant. Because this
sample only has three events, the power of these tests is low.
3.3.6.2 Ex-post operating performance If proxy contests help activists to improve
firm performance, the operating performance of firms on which the activists receive board
seats should also improve. Following the literature, I use ROA (return on assets, defined
as EBITDA/assets) and Tobin’s Q as measures of operating performance. In Table A10,
Panel A and Panel B, I examine the ex-post operating performance for target firms that
granted board seats to the activists after proxy contests. Consistent with the initial market
reaction, both ROA and Tobin’s Q of the target firms improved in the year following the
proxy contests. Industry-adjusted ROA increases by 5.7% (not statistically significant) and
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q increases by 0.44 (significant at 1% level), suggesting that di-
rector nominees of the activists can execute plans and increase firm performance and value
after proxy contests. Needless to say, ex-post performance analysis can only be performed
on firms that remain in the sample in post-event years. In some events, the activist seeks
the sale of the firm, and I would not be able to observe any ex-post operating performance
changes. If attrition to a large extent represents a successful outcome of activism, the re-
sulting absence of the firm from the ex-post performance analysis can potentially induce a
negative bias to inferences about firm performance.
The results in Table A10 for operating performance are consistent with prior literature
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that activism facilitates the efficient reallocation of capital and improves the operating per-
formance of the target firms. After the activists won board seats, the average ROA and
Tobin’s Q of target firms improve significantly. The economic magnitude is large as well.
For example, Tobin’s Q of firms in which the activists won increased by 20% of their pre-
intervention average.
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4.0 Future Research Related to Institutional Investors and Proxy Advisors
4.1 The role of passive investors’ direct engagement in corporate governance
This paper shows that passive institutions do not have enough incentives to facilitate
shareholder activism. It remains unclear whether passive institutional investors are inter-
ested in other governance aspects of their portfolio firms. While existing literature documents
various governance changes in response to changes in passive ownership, it remains unclear
whether passive institutions engage with portfolio firms, and if they do, through what mech-
anisms such changes take place. Because most of the interventions are behind-the-scenes
(McCahery et al., 2016) and index funds seldom file 13D filings, there is a lack of evidence
of direct engagement by index funds. I try to address this question by analyzing a unique
database of index fund engagements, and it will help explain how index funds affect firm
value by directly examining the characteristics of firms index funds target and the effective-
ness of the engagements. Understanding the mechanisms of index fund intervention would
contribute to the debate on how the growth in index investment would affect corporations
in the U.S.
Several studies have documented the active influence of passive funds on their portfolio
firms. Using the annual reassignment of Russell 1000 and 2000 constituents as an exoge-
nous shock for changes in passive mutual fund ownership, Appel et al. (2016) find that an
increase in passive mutual fund ownership causes firms to increase board independence, re-
move anti-takeover defenses, and adopt equal voting rights for all shareholders. Using the
same experimental design, Crane et al. (2016) find that higher institutional ownership leads
to higher payout to shareholders. In contrast, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find that
exogenous increases in passive ownership lead to increases in CEO power and fewer new
independent director appointments. Their evidence on value-reducing actions of managers
after increases in passive ownership comes from an analysis of announcement returns to
board appointments and mergers and acquisitions that are more costly to monitor for pas-
sive institutions than the basic corporate governance characteristics studied by Appel et al.
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(2016). More importantly, there is a concern about the external validity of these results
because of the nature of their identification strategy. Because this identification limits the
sample to a small set of firms near the cutoff of Russell 1000 and Russell 2000. Their results
may not generalize to other firms. Edmans and Holderness (2016) point out that a narrow
focus on identification may lead to a focus on identifying narrow questions and emphasize
the value of descriptive research with blockholders.
I address the problem that there is a lack of direct evidence on intervention from index
funds using a unique dataset that contains engagement data from State Street, the fourth
largest asset manager with assets under management of 2.8 trillion dollars (as of the end of
the year 2017) between 2014 to 2017. This information is voluntarily disclosed by State Street
and published in their annual engagement reports.1 The reports contain many engagement
examples, more importantly, the lists of firms they have engaged with. The engagements
are under general topics such as governance, pay, environmental and social issues, and proxy
contest/M&A.
This research is the first to study index fund engagements. Previous research studies how
pension funds (Smith, 1996; Carleton et al., 2002) and hedge funds (Brav et al, 2008 and
Becht et al, 2009) engage with management and improve firm value. The main difference is
that pension funds and hedge funds can choose from both voice and exit. For index funds,
the inability to govern through exit may increase their incentives to govern through voice.
On the other hand, index funds being spread thinly over multiple stocks may deter them
from engaging in any governance activities. Edmans and Holderness (2016) conclude that
index funds can govern through voting (Appel et al., 2016) but rarely engage in interventions.
The governance activities studied by Appel et al. (2016) are arguably low-cost. The index
fund can apply general principles (e.g. voting against dual-class shares, takeover defenses,
and non-independent directors) without having to analyze each situation.
These reports indicate that large index funds actively try to influence portfolio companies
through channels other than voting. State Street targets around 550 firms internationally
per year. From 2014 to 2016, State Street engaged with portfolio firms in the U.S. 926 times
1BlackRock and Vanguard publish similar reports. However, they do not disclose what firms they have
engaged with in detail. BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street together account for more than 80% of the
index investment market share.
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(excluding issues regarding proxy contests and M&A). Most of the engagements are initiated
by State Street proactively. Target firms tend to cluster in certain industries, consistent with
the view that index funds can lower the costs of intervention by doing analysis on the industry
level and engaging with multiple firms in those industries. Firms targeted by index funds are
different from firms targeted by other shareholder activism identified by 13D filings. Activist
hedge funds are value investors (Brav et al., 2008a) and target firms that are smaller and
have lower Tobin’s Q. Index funds are more likely to target firms with larger size and higher
Q. There is almost no overlap between firms targeted by State Street and activist investors.
Given that most of the indices are value-weighted, it is not surprising that index funds engage
with firms that account for higher percentages of value in their portfolios. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first research to document the stark contrast in these two different
governance mechanisms.
Given the increasing importance of passive investors and the evidence in this paper that
they often oppose shareholder activism, examining passive investors’ direct governance and
engagement preferences can shed more light on how these large passive institutions shape
the future landscape of corporate governance.
4.2 The quality of proxy advisors’ recommendations in proxy contests
This paper finds that institutional investors do not follow proxy advisor recommenda-
tions because they might have different objectives. Nevertheless, extant research provides
strong empirical evidence that proxy advisors’ recommendations have a large impact on
voting outcomes. The quality of their recommendations has a direct impact on firm value
(Malenko and Malenko, 2019). Because the presence of proxy advisors crowds out indepen-
dent governance research by institutional investors, firm value will be lower if the quality
of the proxy advisor’s information is low and shareholders who follow proxy advisors make
perfectly correlated mistakes. The previous regulation on proxy advisors encouraged insti-
tutions to follow the proxy advisors so that they could avoid other potential conflicts of
interests but the SEC recently withdrew the two non-action letters and plan for new regula-
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tions on proxy advisors. The role of proxy advisors in proxy contests received little attention
in recent years, and little empirical evidence exists on this topic. Because the proxy advis-
ing industry has changed over the last two decades, and they may change proxy advisors’
incentives to produce high-quality recommendations, it is unclear whether the quality of
recommendations has improved or deteriorated.
Competition in the proxy advisor industry has changed dramatically. Before 2003, Insti-
tutional Shareholder Services (ISS) dominated the industry, and now ISS and Glass Lewis
together have 97% of the market share. Whether increased competition increases or decreases
the quality of recommendations is unclear. On the one hand, competition may encourage
proxy advisors to compete on the quality of their recommendations, leading to more infor-
mative and precise recommendations. On the other hand, competition may lead to reduced
fees for proxy advisors. Because proxy advisors try to maximize profits, not information
output, lower fees might lead to lower quality recommendations. From 2007 to 2017, the
two major proxy advisors made different recommendations in proxy contests in 23% of the
cases. The literature has not examined the question of how competition affects the quality
of recommendations in proxy contests directly.
The ownership structure of the two major proxy advisors has also evolved. Since 2003,
there are also multiple transactions of proxy advisors being sold. ISS was acquired by Risk-
Metrics in 2006. RiskMetrics went public in 2008 and was acquired by MSCI Inc. in 2010.
MSCI sold ISS to a private equity firm Vestar Capital Partners in 2014. Xinhua Finance,
a financial information firm that’s partly owned by China’s state-run news agency, bought
Glass Lewis in 2007. It was controversial as two executives quit Glass Lewis shortly after
the acquisition and said they were ”uncomfortable and deeply disturbed by the conduct,
background, and activities of our new parent company Xinhua Finance Ltd., its senior man-
agement, and its directors.” The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan bought Glass Lewis later
that year and has been the owner of Glass Lewis since then. There are concerns about
whether the ownership structure may lead to more conflicts of interests and lower the qual-
ity of the recommendations.2 Similar concerns were raised over credit rating agency Moody’s,
2Reuters: MSCI to sell proxy advisory firm ISS for $364 million. ”This sale would not only remove
potential conflicts of interest within MSCI’s business model, but the MSCI stock could benefit as we believe
ISS was not being properly valued.”
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which is publicly traded. In addition to conflicts of interests, some argue that proxy advi-
sors, similar to law firms and accounting firms, should not be in the form of the corporation
because of the potential production distortion when the residual holders lack the monitoring
ability (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).3 How the proxy advisors’ quality of recommendations
is affected by their ownership structure is also a relevant question to the regulators.
The current literature has examined say-on-pay proposals (Malenko and Shen, 2016),
management proposals, shareholder proposals, and uncontested director elections (Li, 2016).
Li (2016) provides some suggestive evidence that competition from Glass Lewis makes In-
stitutional Shareholder Services reduces favoritism toward management. The main limit of
these studies is that regular proposals and uncontested director elections have little impact
on firm values (Denes et al., 2017), so it is difficult to infer the quality of the recommenda-
tions. Proxy contests provide a useful empirical setting because proxy contests often involve
issues that significantly affect shareholder value. The outcomes of proxy contests are not fully
predictable and dissidents lost in 50% of the cases in recent years. Even with the support of
proxy advisors, dissidents still lost in 25% of the cases. Because the voting outcomes are de-
termined by the median voter and market prices are determined by the marginal trader and
these two groups can be different, the quality of recommendations can be inferred when the
proxy advisors announce the recommendations and when the voting outcomes are revealed.
The data on proxy advisor recommendations are collected by searching Factiva news for
both ISS and Glass Lewis. In proxy contests, both management and dissidents have the
incentive to disclose that they have support from proxy advisors, and they can make the
endorsements public to gain more support from shareholders. The reports and the dates on
which they are issued are not available publicly but are available to be purchased from ISS
and Glass Lewis. The event-specific characteristics are collected through SEC filings related
to the proxy contests and through news search.
Given that the SEC is considering issuing new guidance on proxy advisory firms, doc-
umenting whether the quality of recommendations has changed and understanding what
factors are important in determining proxy advisors’ incentives to produce high-quality rec-
3Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (IGOPP): The Troubling Case of Proxy
Advisors
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ommendations is a relevant topic to the regulators and institutional investors. Given that
this research question has not been directly addressed for the period after 2003 and this pa-
per documents the strong influence that proxy advisors have in proxy contests, the research
on this topic makes a significant contribution.
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5.0 Conclusion
Using unique data of mutual fund and pension fund voting in proxy contests, this paper
provides the first set of evidence that there is a significant amount of divergence among
institutional investors towards shareholder activism that is viewed as value-increasing by the
market and leading proxy advisors to the target firms. I hypothesize that the divergence
can be explained by the fact that many institutions hold stocks in both target firms and
their rivals. While the target firms’ performance improves, the gains are diluted or more
than offset by the losses in their rivals. To institutional investors that compete on relative
performance, their incentives to engage are weakened considering the direct impact on assets
under management and indirect impact from future investor flows. I find that the probability
of an institution voting for activists increases as the institution’s industry portfolio return
increases. Furthermore, when the target firms do not have publicly-traded competitors,
institutional investors are much more likely to support the activists. The evidence in this
paper is consistent with the view that institutional investors’ portfolio differences can explain
differences in their support for shareholder activism. It contributes to our understanding of
the interaction between activists and other institutional investors and also has useful policy
implications for regulators. Although Crane et al. (2016), Appel et al. (2016), and Appel et al.
(2018) find positive effects of passive ownership on target firms’ corporate governance, Lund
(2017) proposes that lawmakers restrict passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings
because she believes that passive funds lack the incentives and will have harmful consequences
for firm governance, shareholders, and the economy.
This paper contributes to the debate on the role of passive institutional investors in
corporate governance. Unlike activist hedge funds which hold concentrated positions in
targets and have high power incentives (Brav et al., 2008a), incentives of diversified or passive
investors make them ”under-invest in stewardship and to be deferential toward the corporate
managers of portfolio companies” (Bebchuk et al., 2017; Bebchuk and Hirst, 2018a,b). While
the empirical evidence in this paper is from a sample of proxy contests, institutional cross-
ownership could also have an impact on which firms are targeted to begin with. If activists
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do not launch campaigns that are less likely to be supported by the shareholders, then these
activism campaigns cannot be observed.1 Therefore, cross-ownership potentially leads not
only to a higher probability of failing value-increasing campaigns but also to a lower number
of campaigns launched by activists. While this paper focuses on the activism events, the
results also have general implications on other aspects of institutional investors’ stewardship
and governance activities.
1Appel et al. (2016) find that an exogenous increase in passive ownership of a firm leads to a lower
probability of being targeted by activists. Brav et al. (2018) use a selection model and find a positive
correlation between the propensity for targeting by dissidents and that of pro-dissident voting by investors.
They show that activists are less likely to target firms with higher passive fund ownership.
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Appendix A
ISS US Voting Guidelines
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections
General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested
elections, considering the following factors:
• Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
• Management’s track record;
• Background to the contested election;
• Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
• Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
• Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);
• Stock ownership positions.
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Appendix B
Mutual Fund Family Voting
In this appendix, I provide some institutional details on how fund families vote their proxy
cards. There is heterogeneity in how proxy voting is handled. The following information is
from the Morningstar 2017 survey.
Given the large number of companies in which they invest, most surveyed managers rely
on proxy voting advisors like Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis to provide
data as an input to their voting process. However, the managers do not follow the advisors’
voting recommendations. Instead, they follow tailored recommendations that the advisors
provide based on the managers’ own voting policies, though many also ask the advisors to
flag non-routine votes for in-house review. Some firms, including Amundi and LGIM, use
proxy advisors for research only.
For example, at BlackRock, Amundi, and UBS, the policy is for active fund managers to
vote consistently across all funds, but they retain the authority to vote differently from the
house view. This contrasts with the approach at Vanguard, SSGA, and LGIM, where the
stewardship teams have ultimate authority on the final voting decisions. This is to ensure
consistency and efficacy, as well as to minimize potential conflicts of interest.
Another way to examine whether the voting decisions are made on fund-family level or
fund level is to simply look at how often funds within the same family vote differently on the
same proposals. This is difficult because many mutual fund families outsource their funds to
other investment advisors and the voting rights belong to the investment advisors, not the
management company. For example, while Vanguard’s index funds are managed in-house, a
number of their actively managed funds are run (in part or whole) by external investment
advisory firms.
Appendix C shows an example of an index fund of Fidelity which is outsourced to
BlackRock. According to the SAI of the fund, BlackRock has the voting right of this fund.
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After talking to some practitioners, this is a very common practice for outsourced funds and
I confirm this by checking many outsourced funds’ SAI. Some funds are managed by multiple
advisors and sometimes it is unclear which advisor casts the votes.
However, within-family variations in proxy contests are quite low. Brav et al. (2018)
collect data of mutual fund voting records in proxy contests from 2008 to 2015 and the
average percentage disagreement within a fund family is just 5.51% and the median is 0%
even without correcting for outsourced funds. Crane et al. (2017) also find that there is
very little variation within mutual fund families in terms of votes for all proposals, but for
some family-item pairs, the average falls between zero and one when all funds managed by
an institution do not vote the same. I expect most of the disagreement happens between
in-house funds and outsourced funds.1 Therefore, it suggests that the claim in Morningstar
survey can be trusted and simply aggregating voting decisions on fund-family level provides
very reliable information of the fund family voting decisions.
1I manually verify this for a small randomly-selected sample.
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Appendix C
Example: Fidelity Index Fund SAI
Fidelity R© MSCI Consumer Discretionary Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Consumer Sta-
ples Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Energy Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Financials Index
ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Health Care Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Industrials Index ETF,
Fidelity R© MSCI Information Technology Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Materials Index ETF,
Fidelity R© MSCI Real Estate Index ETF, Fidelity R© MSCI Telecommunication Services In-
dex ETF and Fidelity R© MSCI Utilities Index ETF
November 29, 2017
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
BFA(BlackRock Fund Advisors) assumes general supervision over placing orders on be-
half of each fund for the purchase and sale of portfolio securities. In selecting brokers or
dealers for any transaction in portfolio securities, BFA’s policy is to make such selection
based on factors deemed relevant, including but not limited to: i) the size, nature and char-
acter of the security or instrument being traded and the markets in which it is purchased
or sold; (ii) the desired timing of the transaction; (iii) BFA’s knowledge of the expected
commission rates and spreads currently available; (iv) the activity existing and expected in
the market for the particular security or instrument, including any anticipated execution
difficulties; (v) the full range of brokerage services provided; (vi) the broker’s or dealer’s
capital; (vii) the quality of research and research services provided; (viii) the reasonableness
of the commission, dealer spread or its equivalent for the specific transaction; and (ix) BFA’s
knowledge of any actual or apparent operational problems of a broker or dealer. Brokers may
also be selected because of their ability to handle special or difficult executions, such as may
be involved in large block trades, less liquid securities, or other circumstances. The funds
have adopted policies and procedures that prohibit the consideration of sales of each fund’s
shares as a factor in the selection of a broker or a dealer to execute its portfolio transactions
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and BFA is required to adhere to such policies.
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Appendix D
Time series changes in institutional ownership of target firms
In this appendix, I formally present results of the time series changes in ownership of the
186 institutions around activism events in the sample of this paper. Seventy percent of the
institutions in my sample are classified as quasi-indexers or dedicated institutions by Bushee
(1998) and have low or extremely low portfolio turnover ratios. Therefore, as the figure
below shows, there are no significant changes in total institutional ownership or number of
institutional investors around activism events for target firms with high, medium, or low
institutional ownership 3 quarters before the activism campaigns.
Time series changes of institutional ownership in targets
Time series changes of institutional ownership
Time series changes of number of institutional owners
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While the aggregate institutional ownership stays relatively stable, some institutions can
buy more shares of target and some can sell. To further investigate this possibility, I then
examine the within-institution changes between the 13D announcement dates and meeting
dates. As the figure below shows, the vast majority of the changes in concentration of
target in industry portfolio and percentage ownership is zero and only a few instances the
institutions change their holdings.
Distribution of changes in target’s concentration
To further examine whether the time series changes in holdings would affect institutions’
voting decisions, I use multivariate models and add buy/sell dummies in the regressions of
my main results. As shown in the table below, there is some weak evidence that institutions
that increased concentration in the targets are more about 5% to 6% more likely to support
the activists. It also supports the use of holdings before meeting dates instead of 13D
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Table 1: Top institutional investors’ holdings of DuPont, incentives, and voting decisions
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Table 2: Voting behavior of institutional investors in proxy contests
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Table 3: Voting behavior of institutional investors in proxy contests
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Table 4: Returns to institutional investors around 13D announcements and probability of
voting against the activists
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Table 5: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio returns
using holdings before meeting dates
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Table 6: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio returns
using alternative industry definition
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Table 7: Estimating probability of voting for the activists on whether the target company
has publicly-traded competitors
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Table 8: Market Reactions of Activism Events
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Table 9: The real effects of proxy contests: Stock returns of close-call proxy contests
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Figure 1: Timeline of DuPont’s proxy fight with Trian Fund Management (the
activist) and measurement of direct incentives
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Figure 2: Insitutional ownership characteristics over time
This figure plots the median institutional ownership and institutional ownership concentration (HHI) from
1980 to 2018. Institutional ownership is calculated as the number of shares held by 13F filers scaled by the
total number of outstanding for each firm. Institutional ownership concentration (HHI) is the sum of squares
of each institution’s ownership in a firm scaled by the squared total institutional ownership of the firm.
This figure plots the percentage of common ownership from 1980 to 2018. The y-axis is the percentage of
firms in our sample that are owned by at least one institutional blockholder that simultaneously holds a
block in at least one other same-industry firm. Blockholders are defined as institutional investors with at
least 5% ownership in a firm and classify industry by four-digit SIC codes.
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Figure 3: Activism Events by Year
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Figure 4: Histogram of rejection rate of meetings
This figure plots the distribution of the average rejection rate in the sample that contains 67 proxy contests
of public US companies between 2013 and 2017 in which ISS endorsed the activists’ director nominees.
Figure 5: Average Probability of voting for the activists and institutions’ industry
portfolio returns
This figure plots the average ratio of institutions voting for the activists and institutions’ industry portfolio
returns. The industry portfolio returns are grouped in 10 bins and then for each bin the average support
rate of institutions is calculated. The sample contains 67 proxy contests of public US companies between
2013 and 2017 in which ISS endorsed the activists’ director nominees.
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Table A1: Asset under Management of the Top U.S. Mutual Funds (June 2016)
Table A2: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from types of institutions
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Table A3: Market Reaction of Proxy Contest Outcomes
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Table A4: Cross-sectional regression analysis of activism filings on rivals and voting decisions
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Table A5: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio returns
using holdings before meeting dates
78
79
Table A6: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio return
using holdings before 13D announcement dates
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Table A7: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio return
using holdings before meeting date ((-1,5) event window)
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Table A8: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio return
using holdings before meeting date ((-10,10) event window)
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Table A9: Estimating probability of voting for the activists from industry portfolio return
using holdings before meeting date
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Table A10: Operating performance changes after the activists obtained board seats
84
Figure A1: Distribution of institutions by average support for management and
disagreement with ISS and Glass Lewis
All institutions
Large mutual funds and pension funds
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Figure A2: Average Probability of voting for the activists and institutions’ indus-
try portfolio returns (subsample)
This figure plots the average ratio of institutions voting for the activists and institutions’ industry portfolio
returns. The industry portfolio returns are grouped in 10 bins and then for each bin the average support
rate of institutions is calculated. The sample contains 34 proxy contests of public US companies between
2013 and 2017 in which ISS endorsed the activists’ director nominees and the 13d announcement returns are
above median (2.815%).
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